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This paper examines the role of structural change as a source of
economic growth and institutional and technological change. With the
creation of new activities in the economy, significant changes occur in
institutions and in the way domestic production capabilities are organized,
which alters the ultimate sources of growth in society. This is a complex
process that involves ubiquitous externalities and new forms of clustering
and direct interdependence between economic agents that the language
of modern growth theory cannot fully capture. Neoclassical growth models
construe economic growth in terms of an institution-free equilibrium
algorithm that affords insufficient consideration to macro-to-micro
interactions, changes in the structure of production, the co-evolution of
economic, institutional and technological forces and the process of
creation and destruction of production organization capabilities that
obtains in the economy during the growth process. This paper argues
that precisely these macro-to-micro interactions and the creation of new
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I
Introduction
For more than three decades now, Latin American
countries have conducted market-oriented structural
reforms, opening up their economies to foreign
competition, de-regulating markets, and privatizing
economic activities, at different times and with varying
degrees of success. These policy reforms represented a
major departure from the inward-oriented, State-led
regimes that prevailed in the immediate post-war
period. The new policies –together with the rapid
globalization of the world economy in the 1990s–
worked a major transformation of the economic,
institutional and technological environment in each of
the countries. The structure of production and the
operation of the institutional and socio-economic model
has changed significantly in the Latin American
countries and this, in turn, has affected growth,
international competitiveness, equity and the
development of domestic technological capabilities.
The neoclassical approach is not particularly useful
for examining these issues. Modern growth theory
construes economic growth in terms of an institution-
free equilibrium algorithm that affords insufficient
consideration to macro-to-micro interactions, changes
in the structure of production, the co-evolution of
economic, institutional and technological forces and
the process of creation and destruction of production
organization capabilities that occurs in the economy
during the growth process. In our view, macro-to-micro
interactions and the creation of new institutions and
capabilities are crucial to understanding what economic
development is all about.
The legacy of market-oriented reforms has fallen
short of the expectations that policymakers and
academic economists held in the 1970s, when these
reforms were first promoted. This is clearly apparent
from a comparison of recent GDP growth rates,
international competitiveness and the economy’s
capacity to create new jobs and to distribute the benefits
of growth equitably among different walks of society,
vis-à-vis the post war decades. Domestic technological
capabilities have been hugely transformed by the
destruction and creation of production capacity, yet they
remain fragmentary and sorely insufficient throughout
the region.
In all of the dimensions mentioned –growth,
competitiveness, equity and the building up of domestic
technological capabilities– the new Latin American
economic model yielded much poorer results than
expected (Katz, 2002 and 2003). Furthermore,
notwithstanding the bonanza the region is currently
enjoying thanks to buoyant world demand and high
international prices for foodstuffs, raw materials and
industrial commodities (what might be termed the
“China effect”), the indiscriminate adoption of
Washington Consensus ideas has left most of the
region’s countries still lacking an adequate long-term
growth strategy that could simultaneously secure higher
rates of economic expansion, reduce macroeconomic
volatility, enhance competitiveness in world markets
and yield greater equity and a more satisfactory overall
technological and innovative performance. And yet,
without such a strategy and performance, the Latin
American countries will be hard put to narrow the
productivity and income gap that separates them from
the more developed industrial nations.
Throughout the 1990s, new sectors of economic
activity emerged and many “old” ones were gradually
phased out. Labour was pushed out of both
manufacturing and agriculture and the informal sector
of the economy expanded rapidly in most Latin
American countries. The re-absorption of labour has
not only been slowed by a low investment-to-GDP ratio,
but has been further hampered by the transition to an
environment in which production is organized digitally.
The larger firms in the economy, many of them
subsidiaries of TNCs or owned by local conglomerates,
brought on board different forms of capital intensive,
computer-based technologies for production
organization, displacing old, more labour-intensive
technologies and forms of organization. This process
introduced a strong labour-saving bias into the
economy. Most SMEs have not reacted well to the new
An earlier version of this article was presented at the seminar on
“Economic growth with equity: challenges for Latin America”
(Santiago, Chile, 1 and 2 September 2005), organized by the
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), with the support
of the Ford Foundation and the German Agency for Technical
Cooperation (GTZ).
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rules of the game because of capital market
imperfections, a lack of technological capabilities or
an imperfect understanding of the new responses
required by a more open and deregulated
macroeconomic policy regime. Thousands of SMEs
were forced out of the market (with the closure of
an estimated 8,000 SMEs in Chile and over 12,000 in
Argentina in the 1980s), while the great majority of
those remaining in business found themselves
lagging behind large corporations in terms of
productivity growth and innovation. One result of
this is that average labour productivity in Latin
America remains rather low by international
standards. In fact, it is still apparently between 20%
and 50% of average labour productivity in the United
States, with Argentina and Chile in the upper part of
the range and Ecuador, Paraguay and Bolivia in the
lower part (Katz, 2003).
It may justifiably be argued that the market-
oriented reforms and the process of world economic
globalization of the last two decades have induced a
major Schumpeterian episode of creation and
destruction of production capacity, significantly altering
the production structure and patterns of social
organization. Business concentration has increased and
so has the influence of foreign-owned firms in the
economy. It is increasingly evident that large firms
adapted better to the new policy environment than SMEs
did, and the labour productivity gap between the two
types has expanded significantly.
Even though the reforms have not delivered what
they were expected to, they have nevertheless resulted
in the emergence of a modern sector of economic
activity in each of the region’s countries. This sector
accounts for some 40% of GDP in the richest countries
and little more than some 10% in the poorest ones. It
features new productive activities that were either
absent from the economy just a few years ago or were
performed using less modern technologies. These new
activities include: (i) natural-resource-processing
activities which now employ state-of-the-art
technologies, such as genetically modified soybean and
vegetable oil production in Argentina, salmon farming
and winegrowing in Chile, fresh flowers in Colombia,
and many others; (ii) high-productivity service
industries including banks, telecoms, energy and
tourism; and (iii) a few technology-intensive
manufacturing activities, such as aeronautical design
and construction in Brazil, or the assembly –mostly
from imported parts and components– of motor vehicles
and electronic equipment in Mexico.
Labour productivity has evolved at a much slower
pace as an overall average than it has in the modern
section of the economy, however. As far as average
labour productivity is concerned, the region compares
rather poorly with more developed industrial nations
or with East Asian countries, many of which increased
their long-term labour productivity throughout the
1990s. Thus, for the economy as a whole, the labour
productivity gap vis-à-vis the more developed industrial
economies remains as large as it was two decades ago.
The small fraction of society located in the modern
sector of the economy enjoys well-above-average
incomes and has gradually developed consumption
patterns comparable to the great majority of citizens in
developed industrial nations. For the individuals in this
part of society, the question of whether convergence
will ever occur is merely rhetorical, insofar as their
lifestyle is quite similar to that of the citizens of, say,
Madrid or Rome. Clearly, however, deeper and more
intractable forms of social and economic exclusion have
emerged in society and levels of informality and open
unemployment are higher than in the past. A more
confrontational variety of social relations –which has
grown out of a climate of mounting frustration and
despair– is now widespread, making political
governance an increasingly difficult proposition in
many Latin American countries.
This paper will look at the role of structural change
as a source of economic, institutional and technological
development. The importance of structural change as
part of the development process, which is examined in
Section II, was explicitly acknowledged by classical
economists. It has been relegated to a secondary
position in modern neoclassical growth models,
however, which tend to construe economic growth in
terms of an aggregate, economy-wide, institution-free
algorithm and do not properly factor in structural
change, macro-to-micro interdependencies or the co-
evolution of economic, institutional and technological
forces typical in the economic development process.
Section III considers the empirics of this argument,
showing the extent to which structural change has been
a major force in Latin American growth in the past few
decades. Section IV examines local technology
generation in the region and section V looks at
possibilities for technological development and
innovation policies.
With the emergence of new activities in the
economy, institutions and domestic production
organization capabilities have changed significantly,
affecting the ultimate sources of growth in society.
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This is a complex process that involves ubiquitous
externalities and new forms of clustering and direct
interdependence among economic agents and public
sector organizations, such as regulatory agencies,
universities and municipal authorities, which the
language of modern growth theory is inadequate to
express. For all its highly stylized and elegant
presentation, such theory simply lacks the ability to
illuminate major details of the process. In order to
shed light on these phenomena, we look at two specific
cases in Argentina and Chile. In the case of Argentina,
we examine the recent development of the genetically
modified soybean and vegetable oil industry; in the
case of Chile we look at salmon farming. We will show
that the emergence of these new activities in the
economy has been associated with the development
of new institutions, new forms of clustering and the
gradual expansion of domestic production
organization capabilities which, as classical
economists have always argued, constitute the essence
of economic development –the ultimate explanation
of how it occurs.
Although new production activities have been
successfully incorporated into the economy in the recent
past, structural transformation in Latin American economies
has been rather slow and average labour productivity has
remained in the range of 30% to 50% of the figure in more
developed industrial nations. Similarly, R&D expenditure
is still just a quarter of the amount developed and emerging
countries spend on creating and adopting new technologies.
The diffusion of ICTs is still in its infancy in Latin America,
since they reach only about a third of the population.
Only the large firms in the economy have so far adopted
computer-based SCM (supply chain management) and
CRM (customer relationship management) techniques
in their day-to-day operations. Thus, the transition to
modernity is still fragmentary and unsatisfactory.
This state of affairs can be traced back to different
forms of market failure and to the lack of public goods
that could induce a faster rate of innovation and spur
technology creation. If they are to achieve gains in
innovation and productivity growth, Latin American
economies need proactive government strategies and
many new forms of public-private coordination.
II
Structural change as a source
of economic growth
In the classical tradition, which was brought back into
vogue in the post-war period by such authors as S.
Kusnetz, G.W.E. Salter, M. Abramovitz, N. Kaldor and,
more recently, R. Nelson, S. Winter and P. Saviotti and
J. L. Gaffard, structural change is considered a powerful
source of economic growth. It is associated with more
“roundaboutness” in the economy and with increasing
returns to scale derived from specialization. A growing
economy is one that becomes more complex and
sophisticated as new sectors of economic activity are
created and as new, more knowledge-intensive firms
enter it. Concomitantly, new institutions, skills, and
learning processes develop right across the productive
and social structure. This is the process that led Kusnets
and Abramovitz to differentiate between “immediate”
and “ultimate” sources of economic growth. They view
an expanding capital-to-labour ratio –resulting from a
higher rate of investment to GDP– as an “immediate”
source of growth, while learning, the accumulation of
domestic technological capabilities, institutional
changes and the improvement of production
organization capabilities are “ultimate” sources of
economic and social development and represent hidden
social forces at work under the surface. That we do not
normally measure these –indeed, in many cases, we do
not even know how to do so– in no way refutes their
existence or negates them as the essence of
development.
In this light, we believe that the long-term
performance of any given economy should not be
described exclusively in macro terms but rather as the
outcome of the interaction between the macro and the
micro and the co-evolution of economic, institutional
and technological forces that converge in the process
of economic development. Development (as opposed
to growth) is associated essentially with the inception
of new activities in the economy. It is not solely the
action of good management of macroeconomic
59C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 9  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 6
STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND DOMESTIC TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES  •  JORGE KATZ
variables upon expectations and upon the rate of capital
formation; rather, it is a more complex social
phenomenon in which institutional changes, changes
in the division of labour (more roundaboutness in the
economy), learning processes and the expansion of
production organization capabilities are fundamental.
Of course, macroeconomic stability is essential for these
processes, but it should not be regarded as a sufficient
condition in itself.
Many of these changes in the ultimate sources of
growth converge in the process of inception of new
activities in the economy. As production capacity
expands, learning processes are triggered and new
institutions (understood as long-term habits and patterns
of social interaction among economic agents) emerge.
The start-up of new activities is at the root of long-
term transformation of society.
Contrary to conventional growth theory, which
treats the production structure as given and construes
its expansion over time as occurring along a balanced
trajectory (like an expanding balloon –to borrow the
illuminating metaphor used by A. Harberger (1998)–
in which the relative size of each part of the structure
remains unaltered as the balloon expands), it is apparent
that structural change is actually what much of
development is all about. Change in the production
structure is what admits increased roundaboutness,
specialization and productivity growth, as well as the
gradual expansion of more knowledge-intensive
production activities, including the production of capital
goods and engineering services.
Furthermore, after new sectors of economic
activity have developed, changes gradually occur in
the industrial organization and competitive regime of
the emerging activities. New firms begin to enter these
activities, markets become more contested and efforts
increase to differentiate products and enhance
international competitiveness. New forms of
collaboration and clustering emerge among firms and
they develop new patterns of interaction with each other
and with other organizations in the economy, such as
universities, engineering companies, trade unions,
banks and insurance companies, regulatory agencies,
municipalities and so forth. There is no single, universal
pattern to this process. No “one-size-fits-all” model of
structural transformation adequately describes all the
situations that arise in real life. Variety and the dynamics
of social and technological transformation are the very
essence of the process. Sometimes the dynamic agent
driving the creation of a new economic activity is a
multinational corporation (or more than one), which is
instrumental in transferring technology, opening up
external markets, training domestic labour and
subcontractors and enhancing domestic engineering
practices. In other cases, the process is driven by family-
owned SMEs or by large domestic conglomerates, which
may be public, private or both. Of course, the industrial
organization model and the learning process of firms
and public organizations vary according to market
structure and performance, the pattern of clustering and
interactions between large and small firms in the
economy, subcontracting practices, access to external
markets and so forth. Far from being neutral in this
process, the State is frequently an active agent playing
a role through regulatory agencies, financial
institutions, universities and municipal authorities,
providing public goods, creating markets and
institutions and developing the technological
capabilities that act as catalysts in the process.
 The differences in the way economic sectors move
along the learning path and the effect of different types
of government intervention in terms of inducing
innovation and economic expansion came out quite
clearly in the East Asian Miracle study conducted by
the World Bank (World Bank, 1993). The research
findings certainly surprised the World Bank
researchers, who had expected conventional market
forces to underlie the successful growth experience of
Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan Province of China. Instead, they found that the
Republic of Korea was, basically, a story of cheabol
and high business concentration, while the driving
forces in Taiwan Province of China were SMEs with
much less economic concentration, and development
dynamics in Singapore were powered by TNCs.
Nevertheless, in all three cases, the researchers also
found significant public-sector involvement in
supporting the start-up of new activities in the economy
or creating the markets, institutions and domestic
technological capabilities to backstop growth. The State
took steps to coordinate firms and public-sector R&D
agencies and to develop the public goods needed to
accelerate the process of economic development.
By the same token, the recent expansion of salmon
farming and winegrowing in Chile, of genetically-
modified soybean and vegetable oil in Argentina and
of the fresh flower business in Colombia all reflect quite
different economic and institutional models as regards
the creation of new production activities and export
capabilities. They have all come about through quite
different processes of institutional, social and
technological transformation. In none of the three cases
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can successful expansion be put down to good
macroeconomic management alone. Whereas salmon
farming in Chile was driven basically by SMEs, with the
State playing a proactive role through the Chilean
Development Corporation (CORFO) and the Chile
Foundation, the development of the soybean and
vegetable oil industries in Argentina was powered by
large TNCs –Monsanto among others– with less public
sector intervention. Also, the soybean and vegetable oil
industries in Argentina exhibit much less clustering and
fewer externalities than Chilean salmon farming does.
In the early years of the development of a new
industry, growth is conditioned by the rate at which
new production capacity can be created (Saviotti
and Gaffard, 2004). On entering the economy, new
firms –local and foreign alike– build new plants, hire
labour and cultivate subcontractors. They make
decisions on the basis of their expected profits, which
depend on the existence of a large market for them to
cater for and on the global macroeconomic and
institutional scenario in which they operate. The
expectation of a large market creates a strong incentive
to build new production capacity, but the rate at which
this capacity comes on stream depends on the
availability of financial resources, production know-
how, trained labour and country-and-sector-specific
institutional and regulatory conditions.
The high gross margins normally yielded during
the early period tend to narrow as imitations emerge
and new firms enter the market. Market structure
gradually shifts towards a more competitive model in
which growth is determined by the rate of expansion
of demand, whether domestic or foreign. The industry
gradually comes to a plateau in which Schumpeterian
rents diminish and price competition and product
differentiation become key components of individual
firms’ corporate strategy. This is basically the story
behind the recent expansion of salmon farming in Chile
and genetically modified soybean and vegetable oil
production in Argentina, as this paper will go on to
discuss. In both cases, the successful development of a
new economic activity has given rise to new institutions
and new patterns of international competitiveness in
the economy.
From this perspective, the greater or lesser success
of any development process has much to do with the
introduction of new production activities into the
economy. Chile, in particular, went through a successful
process of structural transformation in the late 1980s
and the 1990s. Chile’s mining, telecoms, pulp and paper
industry, salmon farming and transformation of
winegrowing into a highly internationally competitive,
state-of-the-art industry patently exemplify an economy
that has come through a successful process of structural
and institutional transformation. Latest-generation
plants, professional management, increasingly
sophisticated regulatory institutions and local clustering
developed on a par with growing penetration in world
markets. The public sector, far from adopting a hands-
off strategy, played an active role in this process. The
Chilean process is a palpable example of structural and
institutional transformation that a conventional macro
account of the economy’s performance simply fails to
capture.
III
Structural change, the emergence of new
activities in the economy and the development
of new sectoral regimes
This section will examine the empirical evidence on
structural changes in the economy of the region over
the past three decades. Table 1 shows the changing
composition of manufacturing output in Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico over the period
1970-2002. It also gives a structural change index
calculated by ECLAC on the basis of its Industrial
Performance Analysis Program (PADI).1
1
 The figures shown in table 1 were calculated using the Commission’s
PADI software. Thanks are due to G. Stumpo and J. Marincovic of the
Division of Production, Productivity and Management of ECLAC for
providing access to the data and helping with calculations.
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Table 1 shows that Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Colombia have experienced a radical transformation
in their industrial structure over the past three decades,
in a shift towards natural-resource-processing industries
and food production. Examples of such transformation
are the production of genetically modified soybeans
and vegetable oil in Argentina, winegrowing and
salmon farming in Chile, fresh flowers in Colombia
and steel and pulp and paper in Brazil.
Mexico’s structural transformation followed a
different direction. In Mexico natural-resource-
processing actually contracted as a proportion of
manufacturing output, while the motor vehicle industry
expanded relative to other activities. As well as motor
vehicles, another industry to expand in Mexico was the
assembly of television sets, video recorders and
computers for the United States market, mainly from
imported intermediate parts and components. Maquila-
type assembly industries, which make intensive use of
cheap unskilled labour, are typical of the structural
transformation in other countries in the region such as
Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, as well as
Mexico.
The structural change index quoted in table 1
indicates that, of all the economies, Chile’s underwent
the strongest process of structural transformation in
1970-1996. In the late 1990s, the Chilean structural
change index2  contracted sharply, indicating that the
incorporation of new productive sectors into the
economy slowed in this period. In effect, between 1998
and 2003 investment as a percentage of GDP and the
economic growth rate both slowed heavily in Chile, at
the same time as the structural transformation of the
economy lost momentum.
As noted earlier, the start-up of new production
activities is normally associated with major economic,
institutional and technological changes that co-evolve
within the process of economic development and
influence each other in ways that are complex and as yet
little understood. Seeking to shed light upon this process,
there follows a brief examination of two specific cases:
genetically modified soybean and vegetable oil
production in Argentina and salmon farming in Chile.
1. Genetically modified soybean and vegetable oil
production in Argentina
Transgenic crops began to be commercialized more
widely in the world in 1995. By 2002 there were nearly
60 million hectares under cultivation, 14 million of them
TABLE 1
Latin America (five countries): Changes in the structure
of industry, 1970-2002 aa
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico
1970 1996 2000 2002 1970 1996 2000 2002 1970 1996 2000 2002 1970 1996 2000 2002 1970 1996 2000 2002
I 13.2 9.9 8.6 6.7 16.2 25.6 26.0 26.5 11.4 10.4 10.5 10.0 12.3 10.1 8.7 9.0 12.0 14.4 16.4 15.6
II 10.9 7.2 7.4 6.1 6.8 7.3 8.3 8.9 5.5 1.9 2.3 1.9 3.0 6.5 4.9 6.5 8.4 14.6 18.8 18.6
III+IV 47.8 62.1 65.3 71.7 37.8 43.4 41.6 41.5 58.3 59.7 60.7 61.9 46.2 55.4 57.0 57.1 43.2 43.4 39.1 40.8
V 28.1 20.7 18.7 15.6 39.2 23.7 24.0 23.1 24.9 28.0 26.5 26.2 38.5 28.1 29.4 27.3 36.4 27.6 25.8 25.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
SCIb 14.3 18.0 25.3 18.9 32.3 27.6 40.1 27.3 33.5 19.4 29.9 30.9 17.3 22.1 22.5
Source: Industrial Performance Analysis Program (PADI), software developed by the Industrial and Technological Development Unit of the
Division of Production, Productivity and Management of ECLAC.
a Structural change index, base year = 1970.
b I = Engineering-intensive industries, excluding automobiles (International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities
(ISIC) 381, 382, 383, 385).
II = Automobiles (ISIC 384).
III+IV = Natural-resource-intensive industries. Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco (ISIC 311, 313, 314); resource-processing industries
(ISIC, 341, 351, 354, 355, 356, 371, 372).
V = Labour-intensive industries (ISIC 321, 322, 323, 324,, 331, 332, 342, 352, 361, 362, 369, 390).
2
 The structural change index is prepared by the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) to measure the
intensity of change in industrial structure.
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in Argentina. More than 90% of the soybeans produced
in Argentina today are of the genetically-modified
variety and the country is the world’s second largest
producer, after the United States.3
The transition from conventional to genetically
modified soybeans entailed a major transformation in
production organization and in agricultural institutions
in Argentina. Zero tillage and contract agriculture now
prevail, with the traditional farmer playing a much
smaller role as an agent of production organization.
This role has been taken over by large independent
agricultural engineering companies and subcontractors
that serve a series of different farms and organize
production. Risk contracts for financing and production
organization are now signed with financial
intermediaries and banks specializing in the financing
of soybean production. The subcontracting companies
use a technology package –seeds, fertilizers,
herbicides– which is the private property of large TNCs
such as Monsanto, Cargil, and others.4  This is clearly
a departure from the pattern that prevailed during the
green revolution of the 1960s, when agricultural
technology was basically a public good distributed by
State agricultural agencies.
Many new institutions (in the sense of habits of
social behaviour) have emerged in the transition to
genetically modified soybean in Argentina. For
example, as much as 40% of the seeds used in a given
agricultural season are believed to be retained from the
previous year (the so-called bolsa blanca) and sold as
unauthorized versions in violation of Monsanto’s
property rights over the technology. Monsanto did not
adequately patent its technology for genetically
modified soybeans and the associated herbicides at the
outset in Argentina, and the firm is now beginning
legal action aimed at blocking Argentine exports of
soy pellets to world markets, on the grounds that
Argentina is infringing its intellectual property rights
in this area.
A look at vegetable oil production from genetically
modified soybeans yields a similar picture of major
economic and institutional change. New state-of-the-
art plants built in the 1990s house highly automated
catalytic production facilities whose labour productivity
is tenfold that of the 1970s manufacturing technology
commonly found in Argentina until quite recently. The
industry’s level of employment generation is quite low.
The oil production sector is highly concentrated and
dominated by a few large local conglomerates. Foreign
capital has entered the industry only recently, with
acquisitions of domestic firms.
All this indicates that the development of
genetically modified soybean and vegetable oil
production in Argentina involved major changes in
institutions, production technology and industrial
organization. Increasing returns to scale, externalities
and many new technological capabilities have emerged
in the economy.
2. Salmon farming in Chile 5
The Chilean salmon farming industry has attained
international competitiveness in a process that has
spanned the best part of two decades. During this time,
many new local and foreign firms have entered the
market, sector-specific institutions and skills have
developed and what was originally a quasi-cottage
industry has come to be professionally managed, all of
which has significantly altered production organization
and international marketing practices. The cumulative
impact of these changes gradually led Chile to acquire
world-class status as one of the world’s three main
salmon farming countries, together with Norway and
Scotland.
In the second stage, the industry rapidly increased
in size and complexity, as large numbers of suppliers
of intermediate inputs and services firms entered the
market and a strong sector-specific industrial cluster
was built up. The role of the State changed radically in
this period: it withdrew from the role of dynamic agent
inducing the inception of a new activity to concentrate
3
 Brazil is also a large producer of soybeans. Argentina, Brazil and
the United States together account for nearly 95% of the total world
supply of soybeans, but so far Brazil has not ventured into the
genetically modified variety. Brazil’s large output consists basically
of conventional soybeans and the country has not approved
genetically modified soybean for production (Trigo and others, 2002).
4
 Interestingly enough, Monsanto, the global owner of the Roundup
Ready patent, opted not to register the patent for genetically modified
seeds in Argentina, distributing the product instead through private
arrangements with large contractors and distributors. It is believed
that this reflected the company’s lack of confidence in the Argentine
patent system. It will also be recalled, however, that the genetically
modified seeds must be used with the correct herbicide –glyphosate–
which is also owned by Monsanto. Hence, intellectual property rights
and the capacity for enforcing them in a particular institutional
environment constitute an important determinant of market conduct
in the framework of the current industrial organization (Ablin and
Paz, 2000, p. 8).
5
 This section is based on a previous paper prepared by the author
for the World Bank (see Katz, 2004).
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instead on developing the regulatory framework and
surveillance mechanisms that govern the sector today.
The State also supported the industry in international
negotiations when United States salmon farming firms
made allegations of dumping against Chile.
The third stage in the industry’s development was
a major transformation in industrial structure, which
came about through mergers and acquisitions (M&A),
changes in plant ownership, foreign direct investment
(FDI) and a rapid process of internationalization.
In less than twenty years, Chile’s salmon exports
–consisting almost entirely of farmed fish– increased
from less than US$ 50 million in 1989 to around
US$ 1.7 billion today. Salmon exports now account for
close to 6% of all Chilean exports. From an almost
negligible 2% in 1987, the proportion of world salmon
production Chile accounts for rose to nearly a third in
recent years. A large number of economic,
technological, and institutional forces have been
involved in the process.
In the early years of salmon farming, public
organizations, foreign companies and a large number
of SMEs were involved. Although the public sector
clearly played an important role right from the
beginning, it is also true that a new generation of
Chilean entrepreneurs emerged with salmon farming
and began to drive the industry. Regulatory and sanitary
activities, including fishing and farming permits,
environmental impact surveillance and control of
salmon egg imports, are performed by government
agencies such as the National Fisheries Service
(SERNAPESCA) and the National Environment
Commission (CONAMA). The legal infrastructure to
support these activities was set up in the late 1970s and
the 1980s and was later substantially improved to
comply with international standards (Aquanoticias,
1997a).
In the early years, the industry employed quasi-
cottage production practices and mainly imported
genetic material. Companies still prepared salmon
food, a main component of aquaculture costs, every
day using fresh raw materials. The conversion rate
from food to fish was more than 3:1, i.e., three
kilogrammes of fresh food per kilogramme of salmon
–more than triple the industry’s input-output
coefficient today. Clearly, then, there have been large
productivity gains and individual firms have
undergone major learning processes (Aquanoticias,
1997b, p. 24). Such examples abound in relation to
cultivation tanks, vaccines, final product processing
and so forth (Aquanoticias, 1998, p. 12).
By the late 1990s, Chilean salmon farming had
attained many of the features of a mature6  oligopoly it
has today. World prices for salmon fell significantly in
the second half of the 1990s, approaching the industry’s
long-term unit production costs. Gross margins
narrowed as competition and contestability increased
in salmon markets. The industry’s technological and
competitive regime became more demanding as a result
of mergers and acquisitions, which substantially
increased average company size, capital intensiveness
and technological sophistication and heightened
business concentration.
A number of general conclusions may now be
derived from the foregoing discussion of economic,
technological and institutional factors underlying the
inception of genetically modified soybean and
vegetable oil production in Argentina and salmon
farming in Chile.
In both Argentina and Chile, the structural change
of the past two decades has been strongly biased
towards natural-resource-processing activities, mainly
agricultural products and foodstuffs, pulp and paper,
fisheries, gas and petroleum. This structural
transformation raises many new questions over the
impact of the process and the biological, genetic and
environmental consequences of growth based on more
intensive exploitation of natural resources.
Clearly, the sustainable exploitation of agricultural
land, marine resources, forests or mines demands a
basic knowledge and understanding of such disciplines
as biology, genetics, marine sciences, mineralogy,
immunology and many others related to the
conservation, depletion rate and rational exploitation
of these resources. Some of this knowledge and
understanding can be developed through the use of off-
the-shelf knowledge and technology available in the
international market. Importantly, however, much of
the knowledge base needed for these activities is highly
country-and-location-specific, since the physical,
biological and ecological conditions vary significantly
in different production locations. This is also true of
the capital goods and intermediate inputs needed in each
6
 What a mature industry is, and how the notion applies to salmon
farming, was clearly illustrated in a recent public address given by
Torben Petersen, Chief Executive Officer of Fjord Seafood Chile
(a subsidiary of the Norwegian company of the same name). He
said, “The real maturation process begins when we see that company
actions are aimed at the markets and not at production, in other
words, when salmon farming growth is determined by its market
and not by its production” (Aquanoticias, 2004).
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case. In other words, the metaphor of ready-made
production functions waiting to be lifted from some
sort of international technology shelf does not really
apply to the scenarios that concern us. Applied research
and development efforts are needed to adapt
internationally available capital goods and intermediate
inputs to local conditions and to design and bring on
stream others that are specific to particular locations.
Public sector R&D organizations, university-based
research laboratories and domestic engineering firms
should be steered into technological missions aimed at
developing new country-and-location-specific know-
how and production organization technologies.
An examination from this perspective prompts the
usual questions about market failure, lack of public
goods and the imperfect appropriability of benefits.
The need for government intervention is evident if
Latin American countries are to exploit their natural
resources in a rational and sustainable manner.
Undoubtedly, good macroeconomic management is a
sine qua non for success, but what is crucial –and what
the public sector must carefully consider if Latin
American countries are to properly realize the growth
potential embodied in their rich natural-resource
endowment– is the technological, economic and
institutional complexity of each particular situation.
This leads to the examination of how technology-
generation capabilities have evolved so far in the





Latin American firms have not so far shown much
interest in being part of technology generation efforts
to develop proprietary technology. Unlike successful
firms in other catching-up economies, Latin American
firms have not, until now, given much indication of
significantly expanding in-house R&D activities nor of
strengthening links with local universities, public sector
labs and engineering firms to develop new product
designs or new process technologies. Nor have they
attempted to export “pure” forms of technology or
know-how resulting from their internal learning
processes, as Swedish and Finnish firms have done in
the pulp and paper sector, Netherlands and Scottish
firms in salmon farming and dairy products, and
Canadian firms in cooper refining.7  Most Latin
American firms seem to be content with a more passive
stance on those matters.
Is it simply a matter of time until Latin American
companies eventually work up an appetite for a more
dynamic take on this front, or is this a long-term pattern
of behaviour that will need a different public policy
approach to inject technological dynamism into the
business sector of the economy? We believe this latter
to be the case, as explained below.
Latin American firms’ lack of involvement in
technology generation appears to be a deeply-rooted
feature of local production organization models
deriving, on the one hand, from the fragmented and
inefficient public sector knowledge-generation
infrastructure Latin American countries erected during
the post-war period and, on the other, from the lack of
incentives for firms to expand in-house technology-
generation efforts and R&D expenditure.8
Spending on R&D has always been low in the
region, usually no more than half a percentage point of
7
 This said, interestingly enough, Argentine, Brazilian and Mexican
metalworking firms and engineering consultants exported pure
technology in the form of turn-key plants and licensing contracts in
the 1970s and early 1980s. This went unnoticed in the wave of highly
derogative criticism of inward-oriented industrialization in the
1980s. On the topic of Latin American technology exports, see
Amsdem (2001).
8
 Many Latin American firms systematically engage in adaptive
knowledge-generation for process and product improvement.
Although much of this involves incremental knowledge generation
and changes in production organization routines, these activities
are not normally captured by conventional surveys measuring R&D
efforts at the individual company level. Being informal, efforts of
this sort and the spending they entail are normally underreported.
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GDP. It varies between a third and a quarter of more
advanced countries’ allocations to new technology
development, as figure 1 indicates. Moreover, 80% of
total R&D expenditure has traditionally been carried out
by the State in public sector laboratories and State
universities.
We still know very little about why public or
private organizations and institutions work well (or not)
as generators and disseminators of knowledge in any
given country. We do know, however, that markets do
not perform well in this respect, as a result of imperfect
information, weak property rights, lack of human
capital endowments and many other reasons. Much of
the lack of individual firm involvement and inefficient
country-wide behaviour as regards technology
generation and diffusion may be put down to poor
organizational design, little effort to coordinate and
absence of the right kind of market and non-market
incentives. How much a country spends on R&D
activities is certainly an important indicator of its
commitment to technology issues, but even more
important than the expenditure itself is the efficiency
of local R&D organizations and laboratories in
transforming those resources into technological know-
how for the production of goods and services. Poor
functioning and slack performance on the part of
institutions and an inadequate incentive regime are the
main reasons for the negligible part domestic
technology sources have played so far in innovation in
Latin America. A long road remains to be travelled
before domestic firms, universities, engineering
consultants, banks and insurance companies,
professional associations, municipalities and
government officials in general learn how best to deal
with questions of innovation and domestic
technological development. How can venture capital
markets capable of financing innovation efforts be
created? How can would-be entrepreneurs graduating
from university laboratories be oriented? How can
innovation be made affordable to SMEs? What role could
technology parks or incubators play in this connection?
These and many related questions have yet to be
answered satisfactorily in most Latin American
countries.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, when growth is based
on the exploitation of natural resources further
complications arise as a result of the unique economic,
institutional and technological circumstances
surrounding the sustainable exploitation of such
resources. Some are renewable and others are not. The
opportunity cost associated with depletion and renewal
varies hugely from one field of economic activity to
another, depending on biological and environmental
circumstances. Firms’ economic behavior is influenced
by the cost of exploration for new sources of supply,
the biological life cycle and natural rate of depletion of
each location, the cost of environmental conservation,
the nature of the regulatory framework and system of
property rights in which the resource is to be exploited,
and so forth.
FIGURE 1





























Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Uruguay
Colombia
Source: prepared by the author.
a
 ALC = Latin American and the Caribbean.
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These circumstances affect the planning horizon
with which firms enter the activity, the long-term profit
rates underlying investment programmes and the
strategy according to which each firm decides to stay
in or exit the activity. The political climate that develops
in each country in relation to natural–resource





To achieve better growth performance and enhance
international competitiveness it is essential to expand
domestic R&D efforts and heighten the efficiency with
which domestic knowledge-generation activities are
organized and performed in the economy.
In order to expand knowledge-generation and
diffusion activities Latin American countries have to
tackle financial, human capital and institutional
constraints. In Latin America, national innovation
systems are still highly fragmented and uncoordinated
pieces of social machinery, whose various parts must
function in a more coordinated manner in order to
expand productivity growth and increase the rate of
innovation.
It is crucially important for the countries to increase
their resource allocations for R&D, but it must also be a
high priority to enhance the productivity of the
resources now allocated to knowledge- and technology-
generation activities. The private sector needs to be
persuaded to expand its commitment to R&D and
technology absorption. Strengthening intellectual
property rights and providing financial incentives are
possible ways to achieve this. It is necessary to establish
adequate judicial mechanisms to enforce property
rights, given the weak legal environment in this respect
in most of the region’s countries today. This should be
undertaken within an appropriate framework of
competition policies that would prevent monopolistic
market exploitation by those firms whose patents are
to be strengthened.
 The public sector certainly has an important role
to play through universities and R&D laboratories,
simply exploring the frontier of knowledge as regards
the sustainable exploitation of natural resources, i.e.,
molecular biology and biotechnologies, genetics and
immunology, and human and animal health sciences
and biotechnologies (including those related to vaccines
and pharmaceuticals), as well as in the expansion of
computer sciences and information technologies, which
are fundamental in the transition to a learning economy.
However, the private sector needs to be cajoled into
taking a more hands-on, committed approach to the
development and adoption of new technologies
downstream from the basic sciences, if Latin American
countries are to attain a more rapid pace of innovation
and technological progress. This is essential to help the
countries to expand their exports of products with
higher domestic value added, on the one hand and, on
the other, to provide the public goods and services for
much broader-fronted environmental protection in the
transition to a more natural-resource-intensive
production frontier.
Other members of the national innovation system
–such as banks or insurance companies, universities
and municipal authorities– should also be induced to
engage more actively in domestic technological matters,
exploring new mechanisms to develop venture capital
markets, schemes to build up human capital and
institutional arrangements related to diffusion of
technology in the economy and the protection of
property rights and the environment. New forms of
venture capital markets should be explored with a view
to the financing of R&D efforts. In many countries,
governments are actively seeking out alternative
institutional modalities through which pension fund
systems could be prevailed upon to take a more active
role in this direction. Another possibility to consider is
for the government to act as a second-tier financial
intermediary, decentralizing the management of public
R&D funds to commercial banks and inducing the
banking system to be more active in financing R&D
activities. Around the world, a number of countries are
successfully developing new forms of social
engineering in this connection.
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The creation of technology parks and incubators
should be explored in fields such as agribusiness,
aquaculture, novel uses of timber in housing and
furniture and other fields downstream from the rich
natural resources now being exploited in the region.
Stimuli should be provided for firms offering computer
software and engineering services for SMEs, since
software providers currently seem to be catering almost
exclusively for the needs of large firms, thereby making
computer-based production organization technologies
almost inaccessible for most SMEs.
Strengthening the production fabric at the local and
municipal level requires many new forms of collective
action and public sector coordination. The rationale for
this is that acting at the local level generates strong
network externalities. The development of industrial
clusters around the exploitation of natural resources
creates opportunities for collaborative efforts among
municipalities, regional universities, research centres
and small family enterprises, exploring forms of
interaction that remain essentially untapped in the
region in areas such as agribusiness and pharmaceutical
products. Biotechnologies seem to be opening a major
window of opportunity in this area.
Admittedly, it is a complex matter to generate
local-level collective action and greater coordination
efforts for producing and disseminating technological
know-how. Demand subsidies and public brokers could
be used to help SMEs develop R&D and innovation
projects for submittal to public R&D financing agencies
and banks. Fruitful experiences of this type conducted
recently by Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica suggest that
efforts to develop capital markets may play a key role
at the local and municipal level. Risk-sharing contracts,
public tenders and competitive bidding should be
explored in order to spur private firms’ interest in
technology-generation efforts.
The matter of expediting the transition to a
knowledge-based economy should be a strategic policy
issue for the immediate future. A broader availability
of ICT-related public goods should have a strong positive
impact in terms of productivity growth and of equitable
access to digital goods and services in society. This is
a prominent subject on the policy agenda of many
countries that are making progress in the expansion of
digital infrastructure in schools, hospitals and
municipalities in the world today. This process could
be combined with stronger support for the development
of domestic software providers and contents industries
that cater specifically to the health, educational and
municipal needs of regional and local communities.
Expanding internet connectivity and narrowing the
international and domestic digital divide will take
careful intervention not only in technology and finance,
but also in the regulatory sphere (in relation to the
functioning of the telecoms industry). Issues of
compatibility of standards and network creation should
be addressed in the transition to a digital economy.
Which policies will or will not work to enhance
the technological performance of any given country is
difficult to assess ex ante. The induction of knowledge
generation and diffusion efforts in the economy and
the expansion of equitable access to many of the goods
and services necessary for the transition to a knowledge-
based digital economy are highly country-specific
matters. No one-size-fits-all policy is likely to succeed.
Evidently, there is no way round trial and error and a
highly pragmatic approach to these issues. The
experiences of the dynamic East Asian economies,
whose successes and failures as regards the design and
implementation of technological policies are reported
in the academic literature, and the cases of Ireland, New
Zealand and Israel all confirm that there are no universal
recipes in this field. Different forms of capitalism exist
around the world and it is time for Latin American
governments to actively seek out their own brand,
phasing out the old Washington-consensus ideas of the
1980s and starting to experiment with country-specific
interventions aiming at developing a more vibrant
national innovation system.
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